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Abstract 
Most studies on regional clusters focus on identifying factors and processes that make clusters grow. 
However, sometimes technologies and market conditions suddenly shift, and clusters decline. This paper 
analyses the process of decline of the wireless communication cluster in Denmark. The longitudinal study 
on the high-tech cluster reveals that technological lock-in and exit of key firms have contributed to 
decline. Entrepreneurship has a positive effect on the cluster’s adaptive capabilities, while multinational 
companies have contradicting effects by bringing in new resources to the cluster but being quick to 
withdraw in times of crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
Regional clusters have gained much attention from scholars and practitioners over the last 20 years. One 
of the aspects investigated intensively in cluster research is the emergence and growth of clusters. In 
contrast, relatively little is known about how clusters evolve over time and why some clusters decline. 
The survival of clusters is of great interest for policy makers, as decline will cause turmoil in regional 
economies. Detailed empirical studies on cluster decline are thus crucial in order to reveal patterns in how 
clusters decline.  
It is commonly observed that disruptions, which often come from sudden changes in the industry, key 
technologies, and the market, pose threat to clusters. The seminal work by GRABHER (1993) on the 
decline of the Ruhr district describes how the cluster started to decline after a disruption in demand. He 
argues that firms were not able to adapt to the disruption because of lock-in. Examples of Silicon Valley 
and Route 128 also show how disruptions affect clusters. Both clusters experienced disruption in the 
1980s: Silicon Valley faced fierce competition from Japanese chipmakers and had to give up the RAM 
module market, while Route 128 lost its customers as they shifted from minicomputers to workstations 
and personal computers (LANGLOIS and STEINMUELLER, 1999; BEST, 2001). Both clusters survived 
the threats, but in other cases, clusters start to decline after disruptions. The lack of capabilities to make 
changes to overcome internal and external disruptions – adaptive capabilities – (MARTIN and SUNLEY, 
2006; HERVÁS-OLIVER and ALBORS-GARRIGÓS, 2007) appears to be a key issue in explaining 
cluster decline.  
Clusters are often defined as “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized 
suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions in a particular field, 
linked by commonalities and complementarities” (PORTER, 1998, p.199). The adaptive capabilities and 
the evolution of clusters need to be studied in consideration of the interaction among these various 
economic actors, taking into account the developments in industry, technology, and institution and the 
heterogeneity in actions of firms. As Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) is concerned with the 
processes by which the spatial organisation of economic activities is transformed over time with attention 
to micro-behaviours of economic agents (BOSCHMA and MARTIN, 2007), it provides an important 
research framework for studies of evolution of clusters (MENZEL and FORNAHL, 2010; MARTIN and 
SUNLEY, 2011) and evolutionary processes of regional economic development (MARTIN and 
SUNLEY, 2006; BOSCHMA and FRENKEN, 2006; BOSCHMA and MARTIN, 2007). 
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This paper investigates the process of cluster decline. The conclusions derived in the paper are based on a 
detailed case study of the wireless communication cluster in North Jutland, Denmark. The high-tech 
cluster emerged in the 1980s and grew quickly during the 1990s; however, it showed signs of decline 
around 2004. In its history, the cluster experienced three disruption periods. The cluster survived the first 
technological disruption in the late 1980s. When the second disruption period, with a technological 
disruption and an economic recession, hit the cluster in the early 2000s, entry of new firms stopped, while 
exits increased. This process of decline was enhanced in 2009, when the third technological disruption 
and another economic recession came, and the two largest R&D firms closed down within a few months.  
The paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, the paper provides a detailed 
longitudinal study on cluster decline, which is rather scarce in the literature. The data that span the whole 
history of the cluster allowed the analysis of the decline in light of the development path that the cluster 
has experienced. Secondly, the explanation for cluster decline with attention to disruptions and lock-in 
contributes to the discussion in EEG. The paper argues that clusters are often exposed to disruptions and 
they start to decline when the cluster’s adaptive capabilities are limited in the time of disruptions. Firm-
level dynamics including the relations among the firms and the joint action in the cluster can shed light on 
how adaptive capabilities change. Lastly, unlike other decline studies focusing on the industries that are in 
decline itself, this paper studies a cluster in a growing high-tech industry. 
The analysis reveals that technological and cognitive ‘lock-in’ and the exit of focal firms in the cluster 
was the major force that hampered the adaptive capabilities of the cluster. Innovation and new firm 
formation are identified as the factors that increase the cluster’s ability to overcome threats, while the 
presence of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) is found to have two contradicting effects. On the 
one hand, foreign MNCs increase the employment level and bring investments and new knowledge into 
the cluster, but on the other hand, they are ultimately footloose and will quickly withdraw from the cluster 
in times of crisis. 
Theories of cluster decline are presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes the methodology. The case is 
described in section 4. The conclusions and discussion follow in section 5. 
2. Theories of cluster decline  
 
2.1. Cluster decline and life cycle 
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The cluster literature has focused on the positive effects that lead to clustering, such as the Marshallian 
externalities, explaining that firms benefit from co-location in a cluster through economies of 
specialization, economies of labour pooling and localized knowledge spillovers. However, most of these 
positive factors also have a negative side. When many related firms are co-located, the congestion effects 
raise prices and wages. Labour pooling increases competition for specific skills and thus raises wages. It 
is also easier for employees to change jobs within a cluster, which means that companies can lose 
valuable knowledge to potential competitors. In addition, the localized knowledge spillovers also lead to 
the loss of information that could weaken firms’ performance. The attraction of other firms to the cluster 
might therefore hamper the incumbent firms’ growth (FALCK et al., 2013). SORENSEN and AUDIA 
(2000) find both a higher start-up rate and a higher exit rate in clusters, which indicates the existence of 
negative externalities. These negative externalities might hamper the development of the cluster and even 
be the cause of decline. 
In the literature, there has been a tendency to link cluster evolution with industry life cycle. KLEPPER 
(2010)’s theory on the origin and growth of industrial clusters implies that the growth in the industry 
gives opportunity for clusters to grow through spinoff activities. TER WAL and BOSCHMA (2011) 
explain how clusters co-evolve with the industry and its technological properties at the macro-level, with 
the firms at the micro-level, and with the knowledge network of firms in the industry. As the industry 
matures, it experiences shakeout, during which less-competent firms end up exiting the cluster 
(KLEPPER and SIMONS, 2005; KLEPPER, 2010). At the same time, the variety of firm capabilities 
decreases and the network of firms become more stable, which might lead to cognitive lock-in and 
interfere with future learning. On the other hand, some studies suggest that cluster life cycles are different 
from industry life cycles. MENZEL and FORNAHL (2010) argue that different growth paths of the 
computer industry in Boston and Silicon Valley indicate that the cluster life cycle is not the local 
representation of the industry. Instead, they suggest a four-staged cluster life cycle going from emergence, 
growth, sustainment and decline and argue that the diversity and the heterogeneity of knowledge within 
the cluster provide foundation for the cluster’s development. According to them, clusters decline when the 
heterogeneity cannot be sustained.  
The critics of the life cycle approach claim that the concept implies a deterministic and smooth evolution 
that does not fit with empirics (MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2011). The emergence or growth of a potential 
cluster might be stopped and turn into decline at any point of the life cycle. MARTIN and SUNLEY 
(2011) therefore suggest a modified ‘adaptive cycle model’ in conceptualizing cluster evolution. This 
model recognizes that there exist two-way interactions between a cluster and its external environment and 
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posits that there are numerous development trajectories for cluster evolution, based on the four basic 
phases of the adaptive cycle model: exploitation, reorganization, conservation, and release. Among the 
trajectories, non-generative decline and cluster disappearance, which correspond to the decline in the 
standard life cycle terminology, is found to be the outcome of high internal connectivity and rigidity. 
High internal connectivity and rigidity may indicate  poor adaptive capability, which is considered one of 
the important characteristics of a cluster that changes over the phases in the adaptive cycle model. 
Therefore, to understand cluster decline, it is necessary to look at the cluster’s adaptive capabilities in 
relation to shocks, such as economic recessions, environmental disasters, market disruptions and 
technological disruptions. Technological disruptions in particular change the underlying knowledge base 
for an industry and can easily lead to decline if the cluster firms are not able to move into the new 
technology (STORPER and WALKER, 1989; CHRISTENSEN, 1997; DALUM et al., 2005; KLEPPER, 
2010). The disruptions could also be linked to changes in the industry life cycle during an industry 
shakeout. During the shakeout phase, exogenous innovations (JOVANOVIC and MACDONALD, 1994) 
or endogenous innovations (KLEPPER and SIMONS, 2005) create less space for new firms and increase 
the exit of technology laggard firms, which change the industry structure and leave room for fewer 
clusters. 
2.2. Cluster decline, identity, and adaptation 
Cluster decline does not necessarily lead to disappearance of all activities within a thematic field, but is 
linked to a loss of identity. The identity can be understood as the regional industrial identity, suggested by 
ROMANELLI and KHESSINA (2005), which emerges from the shared perception of internal and 
external audience about the features of the industrial activity in a certain region. Internally, clustered 
firms share the sense of community that are often tied to specific technology and product characteristics 
e.g. a software cluster, or a wireless communications cluster (STABER and SAUTTER, 2011). MENZEL 
and FORNAHL (2010) state that a declining cluster can transform itself by moving into a completely new 
field. Similarly, MARTIN and SUNLEY (2011) suggest that, when a cluster reorganises itself, it can 
either renew itself and start a new cycle of growth or it can be replaced with a new one, with new identity 
and new function. However, when the replacement or transformation happens, it cannot be considered the 
same cluster afterwards due to the change in the identity.  
A clusters is a population-level concept. It is important to remember that a cluster consists of many firms 
and organizations that have different strategies. The only way the cluster can change is through the 
actions of individuals, firms and other organisations, all of which may react very differently to the same 
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change. However, the reaction of a cluster as a whole appears to be more than the combined effect of 
reaction of individual actors because of the interconnections among them. SCHMIZT (1995) argues that 
the joint action of clustered firms can be an important element in overcoming challenges. Therefore, it is 
necessary to investigate the actions of different actors and the joint action among them at the same time 
when studying cluster evolution. The adaptive capabilities of the cluster depend on various factors, such 
as the rate of new firm creation, the innovativeness of incumbents, and the willingness of the firms to 
move into new fields, (BEST, 2001; HERVÁS-OLIVER and ALBORS-GARRIGÓS, 2007; MENZEL 
and FORNAHL, 2010; MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2011; HOLM and ØSTERGAARD, 2015). On the other 
hand, the lack of these factors will affect the evolution of the cluster negatively. In the rest of the section, 
the key factors that influence cluster evolution will be discussed. 
Lock-in  
According to GRABHER (1993), lock-in consists of factors that diminish a cluster’s ability to recognize 
and make adjustments to sudden changes. GRABHER identifies three kinds of lock-ins: the first is a 
functional lock-in, which refers to hierarchical inter-firm relationships that hinder suppliers from 
developing critical functions such as marketing and R&D. Cognitive lock-in means that clustered firms 
share a common worldview or mindset that makes it hard for them to respond to outside changes. 
Political lock-in concerns institutional effort to maintain existing industry structures which might damage 
the development of creativity.  
The case of the Ruhr area shows that lock-in affects  cluster evolution negatively (GRABHER, 1993). 
The Ruhr area faced disruptions stemming from falling demand and rising competition as early as in the 
1960s. However, the functional lock-in led to lack of innovation among suppliers, which were suffering 
from ‘dependent supplier syndrome’, and the groupthink from the cognitive lock-in made the firms 
believe that the worrying demand trend was only a short-term disruption. The firms were thus not able to 
respond in a timely manner to the changes in the environment. Cognitive lock-in is a fundamental 
problem for cluster firms in reacting to external changes. POUDER and ST. JOHN (1996) assert that the 
managers in the clustered firms have similar mental models because they have similar industry experience 
and educational training within a certain field. Through the origination and convergence phase of cluster, 
the existence of similar mental models and the proximity among the clustered firms induce groupthink as 
managers direct attention mostly towards the other cluster firms rather than firms outside the cluster and 
create narrow focus on their strategies. The clustered firms will eventually act differently than non-
clustered firms and can miss out signals from outside the cluster, which can be critical for the continuity 
of the cluster.  
   7 
 
Cognitive and functional lock-in can also lead to technological lock-in, if the firms are too focused on the 
current products and technologies or if the firms have not developed sufficient innovative competences. 
Then, they are less attentive to developing new technologies and products, which will also lead to a low 
level of entrepreneurship within firms (intrapreneurship). All in all, lock-in in incumbents leads to lack of 
innovation and intrapreneurship, which in turn makes the cluster less adaptive when the technologies shift 
in the specific field..  
Lack of new firm creation 
When clusters experience lock-in and show tendency to decline, new firms can be a source of 
revitalization. The Ruhr case described by GRABHER (1993) proves that new firms contributed to the 
eventual reorganization of the industrial district that followed the decline. During the last half of the 
1980s, some firms moved headquarters and R&D departments to other regions. Steel firms changed their 
strategic direction and began to focus more on ‘processing of steel’, diversifying into plant engineering, 
environmental technology, mechanical engineering, and electronics. A new industrial complex in 
environmental technology was formed, comprised mainly of newly established firms. Thus, 
entrepreneurship was one of the forces that drove the renewal of the old industrial district.  
Similarly, SAXENIAN (1990) found that the high rate of new-firm formation in Silicon Valley fostered 
industrial adaptation in the 1980s, when semiconductor producers were challenged by Japanese 
competitors. Unlike the established companies in the region, these new firms began to specialise in 
certain areas of expertise, such as chip design and fabrication processes, and contributed to strengthening 
the competitiveness of the region as a whole. SIMMIE and MARTIN (2010) argue that the Cambridge 
high-tech cluster recovered from the early 1990s recession by continuously branching out in sub-clusters 
based on a strong knowledge platform in advanced mathematics and computing. New firms played an 
important role in this process. On the contrary, lack of new firms could lead a cluster to a declining phase. 
As it is illustrated in the cases above, new firms provide an opportunity for a cluster to move into related 
areas of expertise. When clusters experience shocks and need to adapt to the change, new firms can be the 
driver for the change.  
Among the different types of entrants into clusters, spinoffs are found to be especially important for 
cluster evolution (BUENSTORF and KLEPPER, 2009; DAHL and SORENSON, 2009). Spinoffs, 
defined as firms established by entrepreneurs with experience from existing firms in the same industry, 
tend to locate close to the ‘parent’ companies and perform better than other entrants, thereby driving the 
formation of clusters. However, some firms are better training grounds for entrepreneurs and create more 
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spinoffs than others, while some companies never produce a single spinoff (KLEPPER, 2010). If the first 
type of company closes down, it limits the cluster’s adaptability through entrepreneurship.  
Role of foreign multinational corporations  
MNCs are increasingly basing their knowledge-intensive activities in clusters, “affecting both the nature 
and intertemporal evolution of local innovative activities” (MUDAMBI and SWIFT, 2012, p.1). The 
knowledge activities by the MNCs will depend on their motives for entering in the cluster and their roles 
in the MNC knowledge networks.  
CANTWELL and MUDAMBI (2005) distinguish the subsidiaries with competence-creating mandate 
from the ones with competence-exploiting mandate, using the analogies to exploration and exploitation in 
organisational learning theory. As the subsidiaries with competence-creating mandate invest in R&D 
activities that are qualitatively different from the ‘locally adaptive’ R&D activities of the subsidiaries with 
competence-exploiting mandates, this kind of subsidiary will be more active in innovation activities and 
therefore will have positive influence for cluster’s adaptive capabilities. However, when competence-
creating subsidiaries are located in a highly concentrated industry, they become more like an outsider in 
the inter-firm network in the host country and therefore are inhibited in terms of knowledge inflows from 
the local innovation systems (CANTWELL and MUDAMBI, 2011).  
DE PROPRIS and DRIFFIELD (2006) found a positive spillover effect of FDI in clusters. This 
demonstrates that MNCs can have positive influence on the cluster’s adaptive capabilities by enhancing 
other cluster firms’ competitiveness. The knowledge acquired via the global pipelines can be beneficial 
not only for the firms directly connected to the pipeline, but also for the other firms in the cluster through 
spillover effect (BATHELT et al., 2004). The connection outside the cluster also contributes to increasing 
the heterogeneity of knowledge, which makes the cluster sustainable over a longer period of time 
(MENZEL and FORNAHL, 2010).  
The existence of foreign MNCs in the cluster can also have some negative sides. BIRKINSHAW and 
HOOD (2000) found that a high level of foreign ownership in cluster is negatively related to cluster 
dynamism, which may indicate that clusters with high foreign ownership are less sustainable in the long 
run. High foreign ownership was also negatively associated with subsidiary autonomy and capabilities in 
this analysis. Moreover, foreign-owned firms are less-committed than indigenous ones. Foreign firms are 
more likely to restructure, relocate, sell, and close down units in times of economic downturn (GÖRG and 
STROBL, 2003). The effect of foreign MNCs on the cluster’s adaptive capabilities is thus a double-edged 
sword, as these companies bring knowledge and resources to the cluster, but might also leave quickly and 
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hamper the dynamics within the cluster. If the MNCs are not embedded in the local knowledge network 
and do not participate in the joint action when it is needed, they can affect the cluster evolution 
negatively. 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3.1. Data collection 
The wireless communication cluster in North Jutland is a relatively small and young cluster in a high tech 
industry that emerged in the 1980s and began to decline in the mid-2000s. Despite its small size and 
relative short history, firms from the cluster were important players in the early growth phase of the 
mobile communications industry. In addition, several important innovations, such as the embedded 
mobile phone antenna, were developed in the cluster. This well-studied cluster makes it possible to follow 
the cluster’s evolution closely and to study how the firms and institutions in the cluster reacted to three 
periods of disruption. The case resembles a critical case, and therefore it can be argued that what makes 
this high-tech cluster decline can also lead other clusters to decline (FLYVBJERG, 2006).  
The data was collected in the following ways. First of all, the archives from earlier studies were used to 
identify cluster firms and the early history. This includes newspaper clippings, company reports, 
interview transcripts, draft papers and cluster association material. The list of all cluster firms until 2003 
had been compiled by DAHL et al. (2003) with the founding and exit year, the names of founders and 
their previous workplaces, and the main events in the history of the firm. Then, new entrants from 2003 
onwards were identified by consulting the cluster association’s archive on member companies and 
searching various online databases for newspaper articles, media reports and corporate information. With 
the updated list of firms, the founders of the new companies and their former employers were investigated 
from similar sources. Each firm has been researched thoroughly for main events including ownership 
changes and close-downs, mainly using online sources, but also by formal and informal interviews.  
The next step was to collect data on the number of employees of each firm for the last two decades. The 
early employment data until 2002 came from earlier work on the cluster (DALUM, 1993, 1995, 1998; 
DALUM et al., 1999; PEDERSEN, 2001; DALUM et al., 2002). The recent numbers are collected from 
diverse corporate databases, but since not all firms are covered by those databases, newspaper articles and 
media reports were used to find the numbers that are missing. 
3.2. . The genealogy of the cluster  
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The genealogy of the wireless communication cluster until 2011 summarizes the development of the 
cluster (see figure 1). Fine arrows between firms show that one or more employees from existing firms 
established spinoff firms. Dotted arrows represent parent spinoffs where the management have come from 
local firms. Bold arrows show change in the original structure of the company, including acquisition by 
another firm and reconstruction after financial difficulties. Firms with a dotted box have exited.  
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Figure 1 The genealogy of the cluster 
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4. The wireless communication cluster in North Jutland  
 
The cluster includes firms in the field of maritime communication and navigation, telecom and land-based 
satellite communications equipment, and mobile and cordless communication. In 2011, it consists of 45 
firms, 2294 employees, a university and a cluster association.
i
  
In the early years of development, the relations among the firms could be explained by competition and 
“production-chain-like-character” (REINAU, 2011, p. 296). Later on frequent job change within the 
cluster and the technical educations provided by local university encouraged the engineers to build 
personal relationships with former colleagues and fellow students, which then induced a high level of 
knowledge diffusion via the informal networks (DAHL and PEDERSEN, 2004). The university also 
played a role in promoting interaction among employees and firms by organising research projects that 
helped build relationships and trust between the participants, which then contributed to informal 
knowledge sharing afterwards (ØSTERGAARD, 2009). Lastly, the firms were also interconnected 
through the cluster association. The cluster association created a platform for dialogue and collective 
actions among the cluster firms and the university.  
The cluster has experienced three periods of major external disruptions: 1) from 1988-92, following the 
shift of the mobile communications standard from the Nordic NMT standard to the European GSM 
standard; 2) from 2000-3, when the European standard shifted to a world communications standard, and 
the telecommunications industry was in turmoil following the 3G spectrum auctions and the dot-com 
crisis; and 3) from 2007-9, during the financial crisis, the new standards, and the introduction of Apple’s 
iPhone and the Android smart phones and new business models. The shifts in standards were not 
unexpected disruptions, but they were an immense technological and market challenge that disrupted the 
cluster and the entire industry, see Table 1 for more details. The next sub-section investigates in more 
detail how the disruptions affected the cluster and how the firms reacted, while the following sub-sections 
analyse the evolution of the number of firms and employees in the cluster.  
4.1. Disruptions of the cluster in its history 
The emergence of the wireless communication cluster (1960-80s) 
The history of the cluster (named NorCOM) started with the success of the leading producer of maritime 
communication equipment, S.P. Radio located in a peripheral region with half a million inhabitants that 
was characterised by traditional industries, such as agriculture, food, fishery, tourism, textiles, tobacco, 
and metal manufacturing. The company started producing radio communication equipment for maritime 
use for small and medium-sized vessels in the early 1960s with huge success. A couple of successful local 
spinoffs sprang up from S.P. Radio in the 1970s. In 1973, three engineers from S.P. Radio established the 
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first spinoff company, Dancom. It also produced maritime communication equipment, and competed with 
S.P. Radio in the same markets. A few years later, two engineers from Dancom started Shipmate, which 
also produced radiophones for maritime use.  
In the 1980s, a range of next-generation spinoffs came from Dancom (restructured and renamed Dancall 
Radio in 1983) and Shipmate. These companies diversified into the related area of mobile communication 
equipment, which was led by the introduction of the common Nordic standard for mobile telephony 
(NMT)
ii
. Inheriting capabilities from the parent companies, the spinoffs were well-equipped for this 
diversification. One example of next-generation spinoff is Cetelco, which was established as a parent 
spinoff by Shipmate. Cetelco developed its first NMT phone in 1986, and began to produce mobile 
phones for several European and East Asian countries. At the end of the 1980s, there were 15 firms in the 
cluster, and the majority of those were spinoffs.  
The first disruption (1988-1992) and the result (1990s) 
In the late 1980s, the European telecommunication operators decided to create a pan-European system 
(GSM) based on digital technology. This new generation (2G) became the first technological disruption 
that the cluster faced. The GSM networks allowed for semi-global roaming, which created a larger market, 
but also attracted new entrants. Thus, the cluster firms faced both increased technological complexity and 
international competition. To overcome this disruption, Dancall and Cetelco formed a joint venture 
company, DC Development, to develop the basic modules of a GSM phone together with Aalborg 
University. DC Development succeeded and its parent companies were among the first to produce a GSM 
phone. Other firms in the cluster followed other strategies; for example, Maxon decided to continue to 
make 1G phones and then moved into 2G later on when the technology had matured slightly.  
In the 1990s, more spinoffs were founded based on GSM technologies, producing mobile phones, chips 
and other supporting technologies. This development, however, was not smooth, since several companies 
in the cluster faced severe financial and technological problems following the shift from 1G to 2G. Most 
of the troubled companies and laid-off employees were taken over by other companies in the cluster, 
which shows that the cluster was resilient in this period. For example, Cetelco, suffering from financial 
constraints, was acquired by Hagenuk in 1990. Dancall also experienced financial trouble, as their newly 
developed GSM phone was not competitive because of its high price. Furthermore, the export of NMT 
phones suffered from the growing GSM phone market and the closing of the markets in the Middle East 
during the Iraq war. Consequently, Dancall was acquired by Amstrad in 1993.  
Despite these financial difficulties, the total employment in the cluster increased constantly from 1992. 
By the end of the 1990s, the number of firms in the cluster had more than doubled, mainly due to entry by 
spinoffs. Among the 20 entrants in the cluster, seven were entrepreneurial spinoffs and six were parent 
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spinoffs of foreign companies such as Analog Devices, Lucent, Infineon, and Nokia. In this period, the 
ownership structure of the cluster changed significantly, as many foreign MNCs entered the cluster to 
access the competencies of local development engineers (LORENZEN and MAHNKE, 2002).  
In Denmark, the wireless communications industry was mainly located in North Jutland and in 
Copenhagen, where the latter mainly consisted of a very large R&D unit of Nokia (employing more than 
1,200) and a series of smaller firms. In North Jutland, the firms and the local university had formed a 
cluster association in 1997 and were increasingly visible. The cluster accounted for approximately 2.6 per 
cent of the total regional private sector employment in 2000, but it had become an important part of the 
regional identity. The location quotient of manufacturing of telecommunications equipment in North 
Jutland was more than five in 2000 (PEDERSEN, 2005).  
The second period of disruptions (2000-2003)  
–economic recession and technological disruption  
 
The cluster experienced an external shock in the early 2000s when the telecommunication sector was hit 
by stagnating sales after the burst of the dot-com bubble. After this economic shock, the foreign MNCs in 
the cluster changed their strategies and either collected R&D units in the home country, or reduced R&D 
expenses in the subsidiaries. Consequently, many of the MNCs downsized and sacked local engineers. 
Some existing and new firms were able to absorb the released work force from the foreign MNCs, and 
some engineers even established their own companies. When Telital closed down in 2002, some 
employees joined new parent spinoffs established by two foreign companies. Nokia decided to move its 
R&D unit to Copenhagen in 2001, and former employees established Wirtek. Some local firms were also 
affected by this crisis and closed down. Despite the downsizing and exits, the number of companies grew, 
as there were many new companies entering the cluster. In terms of the wider economy, the economy was 
in a recession in the beginning of 2001, followed by slow growth in 2002 that increased the regional 
unemployment rate by less than 0.5 percentage points. The ICT sector employment also decreased 
slightly from 8,700 to 8,200 from 2000-2. The cluster accounted for half of the employment in the 
regional ICT sector. 
In a report from 2002, some of the managers for foreign MNCs complained about the lack of local 
decision-making power in deciding R&D strategies (DALUM and PEDERSEN, 2002). Others feared that 
distance to end-users and lack of knowledge related to production might become a problem. Many of the 
foreign MNC subsidiaries were dependent on single customers or on internal sales. The shift from 2G to 
3G, the technological disruption, also posed a threat to the cluster. The standardization process for 3G had 
become global planning to create a global standard, bringing about intense global competition. The 
complexity of the technologies and the pressure on time-to-market had also increased. The firms in the 
cluster had various strategies. Some firms were initially active in 3G research (e.g. L.M. Ericsson, which 
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closed down the unit in the cluster in 2003), and others decided to adopt wait-and-see approach to the 
development. Some firms tried to cooperate with others in developing the new technologies, but failed 
(DALUM et al., 2005). As a result, the cluster was not very active in the new technology, which affected 
its adaptive capabilities negatively.  
The impact of the second wave of disruptions started to show in 2004, as many firms closed down or 
downsized, while there were no new entries. One of the big companies, Flextronics, closed down with 
500 employees in 2004. The headquarters in Singapore decided to move the production to lower-cost 
locations. The close-down was considered a tragic event and marked the end of mobile phone 
manufacturing in Denmark, but the overall R&D employment was stable in the cluster, as the main 
layoffs were of low-skilled production workers. 
The third period of disruption (2007-2009)  
–technological disruption and economic recession 
 
The introduction of the iPhone and Android-based smart phones in 2007 disrupted the industry and 
resulted in a significantly decreased demand for traditional mobile phones. These innovations, coming 
from the computer software industry, initiated a JOVANOVIC and MACDONALD (1994) type of 
industry shakeout that completely changed the industry and led to the demise of the dominant firms like 
Nokia, Motorola and SonyEricsson that accounted for 60 per cent of the market in 2007. In addition, the 
financial crisis from the second half of 2008 and the following economic crisis decreased the general 
demand. From 2008-10, the Danish gross domestic product shrank with almost 8 percent and the 
unemployment rate doubled from three to six per cent. The effect on North Jutland region was similar to 
that on the rest of the country.  
These technological and economic disruptions posed serious threats to the cluster. As a result, two central 
players in the cluster, Motorola and Texas Instruments (TI), ceased their activities in the cluster in 2009. 
The entry of Apple and other new competitors made Motorola’s market share drop from 14.3 per cent in 
2007 to 4.8 per cent in 2009. Motorola’s Aalborg division had focused on development of new mobile 
telephones and production planning until the headquarters reduced the number of newly developed 
models, and eventually closed its European mobile-phone divisions. TI suffered from focusing on 
chipsets for 2G phones instead of 3G phones, and ended up closing most of its European divisions. 
Motorola and TI had to lay off 275 and 75 employees respectively, consisting mainly of highly skilled 
R&D engineers. Unlike former instances in which foreign MNCs had laid off many engineers, this time 
the cluster could not take in all the released talent. This resulted in workforce migration to other regions 
and to other industries. It seems that the cluster was not able to adapt to this major crisis.  
4.2. The role and actions of the local university and the cluster association  
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Aalborg University has been very influential for the development of the cluster. Since the university was 
established in 1974, its main role has been to supply highly-skilled graduates. Although the indirect 
transfer of knowledge via graduates has been the most substantial role of Aalborg University, direct 
research transfer also occurred. Center for Personal Communication (CPK), established in 1993 and 
supported by the Danish Council for Technical Scientific Research, played an important role in this type 
of knowledge transfer as this center was established to focus on basic research in radiocommunications 
technology and speech recognition. CPK had several research projects involving both the researchers at 
the university and the employees in the cluster. The research effort in the field was followed by the 
establishment of the large research unit Centre for TeleInFrastructure (CTIF) in 2004.  
During the first disruption, the university contributed to the development of GSM competences, when DC 
development was established. Since the establishment of CPK, the center organized research projects 
aiming at developing other related technologies together with the cluster firms and the leading foreign 
firms in the industry. However, when the technology shift from 2G to 3G took place, the fundamental 
technologies for this new system were mainly developed in the other parts of the world. 3G research has 
been conducted at the university, but it did not have the same impact in the cluster as previously. One 
could argue that, during the second disruption, the university, as a source of new knowledge, failed to 
provide timely input for firm innovation. Realizing the need to develop new competences for the next 
generation of wireless communication technologies, CTIF has since initiated research projects for the 
upcoming 4G technologies with the participation from local firms and leading firms located abroad.  
The cluster association, NorCOM, started in early 1997 as a club of firms and knowledge institutions and 
was formally founded as association with a board of directors in January, 2000. The mission of NorCOM 
was to improve and expand the scope of business opportunities, technological development and 
innovation in the cluster. Internally, NorCOM provided a meeting place for the cluster firms to discuss 
some issues within the cluster and to network with other firms. Externally, it placed effort in promoting 
the cluster so it is visible to the external environment as a cluster with strong expertise in wireless 
communication. More specifically, NorCOM organized industry-specific activities such as symposia, 
recruiting events, and plenary sessions. 
As more foreign MNCs located their subsidiaries in the cluster by acquiring local firms, the share of 
foreign firms in the cluster increased, but they were not as keen on keeping the membership in the 
association as local firms (REINAU, 2011). The local firms were small in their size and therefore needed 
the brand of NorCOM in doing their business. On the other hand, foreign MNCs did not see the necessity 
to be a part of the association as they already have strong brands. Additionally, some MNCs in the cluster 
were direct competitors to each other, which made them reluctant to participate in the joint action, 
especially on technology development. Therefore, the membership in the association decreased over time 
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and the formal linkage of firms through association has weakened as well. The changed dynamics among 
firms in the association over time could have inhibited them to pursue efficient joint action during the 
crises. The decline of the cluster also affected NorCOM. It could not keep its specialized profile and it 
merged in January 2009 with the local industry association for the broader ICT sector.  
4.3. Overview of the cluster in growth, sustainment and decline 
 
The effects of the disruptions are also present in the data on employment and number of firms. Figure 2 
shows the change in the population and the number of entries and exits. The number of firms had 
increased steadily until 2003, as there were very few exits before then, and plenty of entries. Then, after 
the second disruption, between 2004 and 2006, the cluster started to show signs of decline; there was no 
entry at all, while firms continued to exit. There are several acquisitions and reconstructions in this period 
which are not counted as new entry. A decrease in new-firm formation is also observed in the Cambridge 
cluster in its declining phase around 2005-6 (STAM and GARNSEY, 2009). In 2009, entries peaked, as 
10 new firms were established. The majority of these were founded by former Motorola and TI 
employees. However, the survival of these entrants is questionable. Among eight spinoffs, four have 
founders with a regular job other than the start-up. Moreover, the majority of the new firms have no 
employees except the founders and most of them do not show employment growth.  
Figure 3 shows the change in the number of employees in the cluster. The declining trend is apparent 
from 2004. Following the second disruption, total employment decreased slightly from 2000 to 2002, but 
increased again in 2003. From 2003, the number decreased drastically until 2005, as many firms 
downsized and exited in this period. Except for 2006, the number of employees continued to decline until 
2010, when the number increased by merely 24. Figures 2 and 3 reveal the cluster life cycle with a long 
emergence phase followed by a growth phase and a short sustainment phase (2000-3 in the employment 
data). It could be argued that the sustainment period last until 2007 despite the decline in the number of 
firms and employees, because the qualitative description of the cluster suggest that it is during the third 
period of disruptions that the large companies close down, the technological heterogeneity and diversity 
shrinks, R&D employees leave to non-cluster industries and the identity as a wireless communications 
cluster is being challenged. 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
18 
 
Figure 2 Total population and entry and exit of firms in the cluster 
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Figure 3 Employment in the cluster 
 
4.4. What changed the adaptive capabilities of the cluster and made the cluster decline? 
The decline of the cluster is clearly linked to the lack of adaptability in the third period of disruptions. 
Table 1 shows the three periods of disruptions that the cluster faced, the dynamics within the industry and 
cluster at the time of disruptions, the impact of the disruptions, and the change observed after the 
disruptions.  
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Table 1 Major disruptions in the cluster and change after each disruption 
 1988-1992 2000-2003 2007-2009 
External 
disruptions/ 
Threats 
Technological disruption 
 New standard: 1G (NMT) to 2G (GSM) 
- From analogue to digital 
- From Nordic to European  
- Increasing complexity 
Technological disruption 
 New standard: 2G (GSM) to 3G (WCDMA/UTMS) 
- From European to worldwide standards 
- Increasing complexity 
 Tele service providers and 3G spectrum auctions 
Economic recession 
 Dot-com crisis  
Technological disruption 
 New standard: 3G (WCDMA/UTMS) to 4G (LTE) 
- Importance of data transmission 
 Introduction of smartphones 
- Convergence with computer industry 
Economic recession 
 Financial crisis 
Industry 
dynamics 
- Demand 
- Competition 
- Structure 
- Technology 
 Larger market spanning the whole Europe 
 Increasing demand  
 Increasing competition 
 Entry by large electronics firms 
 Large scale production 
 Intense technology development 
 Shorter product life cycle 
 Larger market spanning the whole world 
 Increasing demand 
 Mega competition 
 Alliance between incumbents (e.g. Sony Ericsson) 
 Entry of MNCs from other industries 
  Large scale production 
  Intense technology development 
 Shorter product life cycle 
 Increasing modularisation 
 New entry : Apple, Google, and Microsoft 
 New operating systems 
 Increasing importance of software products  
 New path in technology development 
 Decline of old incumbents such as Nokia, 
Motorola, and Sony 
 Emergence of new leaders: e.g. Apple, Samsung,  
 Emergence of new markets: e.g. China, India 
Cluster 
dynamics 
- Structure 
- Strategies 
- Policy 
 Around 15 firms in the cluster 
 Joint venture by Dancall and Cetelco to develop 
basic 2G technologies. 
 Some other firms continued with 1G phones (e.g. 
Maxon) 
 Science park NOVI providing entrepreneurial 
environment to firms 
 Collaboration with Aalborg University and 
National Telecom Agency 
 Around 45 firms and 4000 employees in the 
cluster 
 Increasing number of MNCs in the cluster  
 Specialisation in different components of mobile 
phones 
 CTIF established at Aalborg University to focus on 
4G technologies 
 Seedbed firms exited 
 Fragmented strategies of firms led to lack of 3G 
competences in the cluster 
- Attempt on collaboration on 3G failed 
- Others did not move into 3G 
- Ericsson with 3G competence closed down 
- Siemens started offshore outsourcing 
 Around 40 firms and 2200 employees in the 
cluster 
 Increasing number of software firms 
 MNCs in crisis 
 Exit of some major firms  
 Diversification among firms 
 Aalborg University focusing on 4G technologies 
 Entry by spinoffs from exiting firms 
 
Result 
- Evolution 
 Increasing number of firms 
 Troubled firms acquired by MNCs 
 Laid-off employees were hired by other firms in 
the cluster. 
 Adaptive capabilities were strong and the cluster 
was still in the growing phase 
 Number of firms and employees started to 
decrease in 2004 
 No entry between 2004 and 2006 
 Adaptive capabilities  were weakened  and the 
cluster showed signs of decline 
 Decrease in the number of employees seems to 
be stabilized while the number of firms increased 
with new spinoffs from exiting firms  
 Limited adaptive capabilities 
- Firms that generated many spinoffs closed 
down 
- Survival of new firms is also in doubt 
 Cluster decline 
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The most important factor that changed was the presence of relevant technological competence at the time 
of transition from one generation of system to another. During the first transition, two firms formed a 
successful joint venture in order to develop the new technologies. The technological heterogeneity 
broadened as some companies founded a joint venture to focus on cordless phones while others went into 
related fields. This broadening of the market and knowledge base must have increased the cluster’s 
adaptive capabilities during the growth phase as suggested by MENZEL and FORNAHL (2010). 
However, when 3G emerged, the development of basic technologies did not take place in the cluster to 
the same degree as with previous standards. Collaboration efforts initiated by some firms did not succeed. 
Furthermore, MNCs decided that R&D in 3G technologies should take place elsewhere. When TI 
acquired a cluster firm in 2002, it simply closed the 3G technology division. The 3G technology, which 
became a major disruption, was vastly more complex than 2G and required huge investments in R&D that 
only large companies could afford. The rise in innovations thus increased the entry barriers and put 
pressure on less efficient innovators (KLEPPER and SIMONS, 2005). Consequently, the technological 
competencies within 3G were mainly developed in other parts of the world. This technological lock-in 
was initially not a problem, because 3G had a slow start and initially seemed unsuccessful, while 2G 
products still sold well. A few years later, smart phones boosted 3G sales. Facing this disruption, the lack 
of 3G competencies became a major problem. In addition, the innovations introduced by Apple and 
Google disrupted the entire industry and increased the pressure for firms to innovate or implement the 
disruptive innovation (e.g. switch to the Android system) or simply exit.  
The technological lock-in did not only lower the opportunities for new firms to emerge when the 
technology standard shifted, but it also deteriorated the competitiveness of incumbents by limiting 
intrapreneurial opportunities within firms, which eventually led to the exit of some important players in 
the cluster. 
Another factor that might have affected the adaptive capabilities after the second disruption is the exit of 
firms that had created many spinoffs. Looking at the change in the population of firms by entry type (see 
figure 4), it can be seen that entrepreneurial spinoffs largely account for the development of the cluster 
over the whole time period. The spinoff process was especially important in the emergent phase, which is 
also seen in other studies (KLEPPER, 2010).  
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Figure 4 Firm population by entry type 
 
These companies became seedbeds for many spinoffs later on, and were crucial for further development 
of the cluster as these function as training grounds for entrepreneurs who gain relevant capabilities and 
routines from the parent companies. The exit of these firms possibly affects the level and quality of 
entrepreneurship in the cluster in the future. This might explain the low level of entry from 2004-10. 
The next factor that changed was the concentration of foreign MNCs in the cluster. After the first 
disruption, some local companies were acquired by foreign firms due to financial problems. Moreover, 
more foreign MNCs entered the cluster in the 1990s, as they were attracted to its competence level. 
Initially, this increased the heterogeneity, creating global links and financial strength. However, the high 
concentration of foreign firms proved to be a weakness during the times of crisis. Many subsidiaries did 
not have much influence on strategic decisions made by the MNCs’ headquarters and were also limited in 
their search for innovation (REINAU, 2011). Furthermore, when the industry was in crisis, many of the 
foreign MNCs relocated their development activities to bigger R&D centres. These negative effects of 
MNCs in clusters is in line with findings in the literature (BIRKINSHAW and HOOD, 2000; GÖRG and 
STROBL, 2003; CANTWELL and MUDAMBI, 2011).  
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5. Conclusions and discussion 
Regional clusters are constantly exposed to external disruptions from changes in the industry and the 
market. A cluster’s ability to adapt to these changes determines the evolution of the cluster after such 
disruptions. This paper analyses the process of cluster decline, which has been a rather neglected subject 
in cluster research. An in-depth case study on a wireless communication cluster shows that changes in the 
cluster’s adaptive capabilities are important in understanding how and why a well-functioning cluster 
turns into a declining cluster following several periods of disruption. What is interesting in the NorCOM 
story is that these adaptive capabilities can change over time, and that a once highly adaptive cluster can 
decline if some factors diminish its ability to renew itself.  
The quantitative data points toward the signs of decline following the second period of disruption, while 
the qualitative signs of decline becomes evident in the third period of disruption, where large MNCs leave 
the cluster, the heterogeneity and diversity shrinks and highly skilled employees leaves the cluster. 
Furthermore, the strong identity as a wireless communications cluster becomes challenged as the 
dominant firms close down and in particular with the closing of the cluster association when it merged 
into a broader association for the regional ICT sector. The longitudinal study on the cluster examined here 
enhances the understanding of the factors that influence its development over time.  
The major force that affected NorCOM’s adaptive capabilities was lock-in. The fact that the firms were 
not able to develop the newly dominant technologies in the industry implies that there was a technological 
lock-in. Cognitive lock-in among cluster firms have brought about the technological lock-in, as they 
focused on further development of the already-existing technological competencies in 2G instead of being 
active in developing new technologies. Organizational lock-in could be found in the operations of 
subsidiaries of the MNCs, where the R&D divisions in different locations had to compete against each 
other for headquarters’ choice of new products. Sometimes, the new initiatives of local employees were 
turned down because they did not fit with the headquarters’ overall strategy (REINAU, 2011). What 
happened in the cluster is also in line with the argument by MARTIN and SUNLEY (2006) that processes 
and configurations built up in the phase of ‘positive’ lock-in – in this case, the phase when GSM 
technologies flourished and created positive externalities – become a source of increasing inflexibility and 
rigidity. 
However, it seems that lock-in is only part of the explanation for the cluster’s limited adaptive 
capabilities. While MARTIN and SUNLEY (2011) almost solely focus on the reorientation of existing 
companies (intrapreneurship) as a source of adaptive change, new-firm creation is also critical to 
adaptability. One way for a cluster to reorganize itself and recover is entrepreneurship (MENZEL and 
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FORNAHL, 2010). This is proven in the case when the cluster experienced the first crisis in the late 
1980s. During this crisis, when firms started to exit, new organizations entered the cluster by either 
acquiring troubled firms or establishing new entities engaging laid-off employees. Silicon Valley, the 
Cambridge high-tech cluster, and the Ruhr area all demonstrate the importance of new firms to a cluster’s 
ability to reorganise when facing disruptions.  
In addition, the strong presence of foreign MNCs in the cluster also influenced the evolution, yet with 
some contradictory effects in different time periods. When the cluster was in a growing phase, many 
foreign firms entered the cluster to get access to its highly skilled labour. After the first disruption, MNCs 
did in fact save the leading cluster firms that had severe financial troubles by acquiring them. In this way, 
the technological competencies that otherwise were in danger of being dissolved remained within the 
cluster. The foreign MNCs also provided access to new markets, financial resources and knowledge 
(BATHELT et al. 2004; CANTWELL and MUNDAMBI, 2005). Entry of MNCs therefore had a positive 
effect on the cluster’s adaptive capabilities in this period. However, during the next disruptions, foreign 
firm’s presence proved vulnerability. They were largely reactive to changes in the industry, as they 
readily downsized or simply exited the cluster during the crises, proving that they are much more 
‘footloose’ than local firms (GÖRG and STROBL, 2003). The MNCs’ decision to withdraw from a 
location also depended on the overall performance of the company and was also affected by the severity 
of the third period disruptions that resembles a JOVANOVIC and MACDONALD (1994) industry 
shakeout. For example, Motorola suffered from a sharp decrease in its market share in the mobile phone 
market, which directly influenced the company’s decision to exit the cluster. Some policy implications 
can be inferred from the above findings. In terms of creating diversity in the cluster and developing 
pipelines to other external actors, the attracting MNCs can strengthen the cluster’s adaptive capabilities 
(see also MENZEL and FORNAHL, 2010; MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2011). MNCs can also takeover 
failing firms and preserve the activities in the cluster in the time of disruption. However, policies towards 
foreign MNCs should ensure that these firms are embedded in the cluster environment and maintain their 
commitment to the cluster over time. The existence of foreign firms clearly brings both positive and 
negative effects to the clusters. The footloose nature might be a challenge when adapting to a major 
disruption. In order to deal with these issues, policies should also direct attention to supporting the local 
actors in retaining the technology leadership within the cluster. For a declining cluster, policies could also 
be directed towards helping the laid off employees entering related industries and avoiding a chaotic 
decline.  
The findings in this paper point to some relevant future research areas. Firstly, studies on evolution of 
other wireless communication clusters within the same period of time will reveal more location-specific 
factors that may affect the decline of clusters. Secondly, how the adaptability of a regional economy is 
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related to that of a cluster is an area of study that needs more attention, as this has policy implications for 
both regional economies and clusters. 
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i
 The average age of the cluster firms is about 11.5 years. The average size in terms of employees is 51, while the 
average size in terms of gross profit is about 3 million euros (this figure is only available for 38 firms). 14 
companies (about 30% of the cluster firms) are foreign owned and their employees account for about 66% of the 
total employee population in the cluster. 
ii
 The evolution of mobile communication technologies can be explained well by technological life-cycles (DALUM 
et al., 2005). Different generations of mobile communication technology (1G, 2G, 3G, and 4G) have life-cycles of 
their own. Within each generation, different systems were developed in different parts of the world (e.g. Nordic 
countries, central Europe, the U.S., and Asia), and competed with each other. The first-generation technology 
system (1G) was represented by analogue mobile systems. In 1981, the Nordic mobile telephony operators launched 
the first cross-national public mobile telephony system, called NMT.  
